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VOLUME XXIX APRIL, 1923 NUmBEIR 3
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
By JOSEPH WARREN MADDEN.*
The American Law Institute was organized at Washington,
D. C., on February 23, 1923. Its purpose is the ambitious one of
re-stating our law with such wisdom and accuracy that the courts of
the country will accept the re-statement as authoritative. The
movement had its beginning in the project of the Association of
American Law Schools to establish a juristic center which should
direct the attention of the law schools toward the improvement of
the law and utilize the learning of their faculties to that end.
The investigation carried on by the committee of that association
resulted in the conclusion that the co-operation of all the organized
forces of the profession, that is, the courts, bar associations,
law schools, and learned societies would be necessary to the success
of the project. A committee was therefore appointed by tho Asso-
ciation of American LaW Schools to secure the necessary coopera-
tion. At the invitation of this committee a distinguished group of
judges, lawyers and law teachers formed a Committee on the Estab-
lishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the
Law. This committee set to work in the spring of 1922 to formu-
late a report as to the advisability of establishing such an organ-
ization, and, if it should recommend its establishment, to present
a proposed constitution and recommend the specific work which
should be first undertaken by the organization.
* Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
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The Committee secured funds from the Carnegie Corporation
to defray the expenses of its meetings and employ the necessary
assistance, and proceeded to formulate its report. It then sent
out invitations to several hundreds of presiding justices, officials
of bar associations and of learned professional societies, deans of
law schools, and distinguished members of the bench and bar of
the country, to meet at Washington on February 23, 1923, and
consider the report of the Committee. The elaborate report cov-
ering one hundred and nine printed pages, was sent to each in-
vitee before the meeting. The response to the invitation was a
gathering of the members of the profession in such numbers, and
with such interest, as to convince the Committee that its self-im-
posed task had responded to a real demand of the profession.
The reading of the printed report had apparently convinced
most of those in attendance, of the necessity and feasibility of the
plan proposed, for' there was no opposition in the meeting to the
general plan. Mr. Elihu Root was elected temporary and later per-
manent chairman of the meeting. The organization of The Amer-
ican Law Institute was completed, with those in attendance as
its members. The constitution adopted states that the object of
the institute is: "To promote the clarification and simplification
of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the
better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on
scholarly and scientific legal work." It was promptly incorpo-
rated under the laws of the District of Columbia to insure the
permanence of the organization. A council of twenty-one emi-
nent judges, lawyers, and teachers was elected, to have the di-
rection of the affairs of the Institute. This council has authority
to determine the subjects of the law to be re-stated, and to select
and employ the personnel for the task, hence it may be expected
that the work will commence promptly.
There was a considerable discussion in the meeting as to the
subjects which should first be re-stated. The Committee had- pro-
posed that conflicts of laws (the entire subject if possible), torts
(dealing perhaps first with negligence), and business corporations
should be taken up first. There was some sentiment in the meet-
ing for undertaking the subject of criminal law and procedure
because of the deplorable condition in which that subject now finds
itself, with its consequent effects of creating disrespect for law
in general, and the clogging of the courts by criminal cases to the
exclusion of their other business. This suggestion was opposed,
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however, because of the fact that the law both of crimes and crim-
inal procedure is largely statutory, varies widely in the different
states, and many of these variations are reflections of mooted ques-
tions of public policy and local necessity, which would not yield
readily to any uniform re-statement. There was fear that if the
Institute should first enter this field, its success would be doubt-
ful, and that if it should fail in its first undertaking, its whole
future would be jeopardized.
The attitude which the institute will adopt in delimiting the
field of its work is probably shown by the following extract from
the report of the Committee:
"GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE WORK OF ANY ORGANIZATION ESTAB-
LISHED BY LAWYERS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW.
"An association organized to improve the law might conceiv-
ably busy itself with yeforms as various as the activities of
man. The organization we have in view, however, is to be an
organization founded by the American bar. It will be created
in response to the growing feeling that lawyers have a distinct
public function to perform in relation to the improvement of
the law and its administration. This function is necessarily
confined to work for which they are qualified by training and
-experience. The fact that a man is a lawyer does not make
him an expert on the tariff, or on the proper organization of
city government, or enable him to speak with authority on
hundreds of other questions of existing or proposed law debated
on public platforms and in legislative assemblies. It is there-
fore important to a correct understanding of the objects we have
in view and vital to the permanent usefulness of the proposed
organization that we regard its activities as restricted to im-
provements in existing law and administration in relation to
those subjects of which the legal profession has expert
knowledge.
"It is the province of the people and of legislative bodies,
through constitutions and statutes, to express the political, eco-
nomic and social policies of the nation, of its states, and of
smaller communities. It is the province of lawyers to suggest,
construct and criticise the instruments by which these policies
are effectuated. The proposed organization should concern
itself with such matters as the form in which public law
should be expressed, the details of private law, procedure or
the administration of law, and judicial organization. It should
not promote or obstruct political, social or economic changes. In
order to ascertain what its work should be we have examined
the defects in our law, rather than those merits of which the
legal profession is justly proud."
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The result of the discussion concerning the subjects for re-
statement was that no change was made from the recommendations
of the Committee, though of course the Council has authority to
make such changes as it may find advisable.
Chairman Root, in response to an inquiry from the floor, made
the following statement with reference to the manner in which the
work, which it is estimated, will cost approximately one hundred
thousand dollars a year for the work upon the three suggested
topics, will be financed:
"The volunteer committee that started this matter realized
that it would cost a good deal of money to go on with the work.
They realized that the work cannot be done by casual dipping in
of busy men out of the hours of their ordinary business, that
able and competent men have got to be employed and paid to
devote their time to the work, in the first instance.
"They realized also that it was impossible to secure funds
for any great enterprise so long as it was vague and problem-
atical, and that it was necessary to carry it to such a point that
persons appealed to to contribute would see that there was a
real movement, with real power behind it, and reasonable cer-
tainty of its going on and doing work. And they felt confident
that if this body which has been called together here would put
itself behind the undertaking, they could then go to the same
sources which have endowed the colleges and the hospitals, and
all the great public institutions supported by private contri-
butions, the same sources that supply the money for Eastern
Relief and the Red Cross, and be certain that a great public work
having public recognition and needing only to be supplied with
means to carry it on would meet with a response.
"Of course if the money cannot be raised to pay the expenses
the undertaking will fail. Equally, of course, if this body is to
be behind the work, the money will be obtained."
The spirit of service in which this enormous task is undertaken
by the legal profession of America should not be underestimated.
Nevertheless the courts and the profession generally, upon whose
support the work must depend for its success, will surely not
regard the work in the light of a philanthropy, nor as undertaken
entirely pro bono publico. Professional selfishness, if no higher
motive, should give to this movement the whole hearted support of
every lawyer. The two chief defects in the law, its complexity and
its uncertainty, at which the work of the Institute will be aimed,
while they exact a heavy toll from the public, are imposing upon
the courts and the legal profession a burden which is well nigh in-
tolerable. When one holds himself out to the public as a legal ad-
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viser, and yet finds it frequently necessary to reserve requested
advice until he has made an expensive and laborious original in-
vestigation, at the end of which he had arrived at only a tentative
conclusion, which he must state to his client with much doubt and
many reservations, the proceeding is one not calculated to inspire
confidence in the lawyer or the law. Such situations will always
exist, but at present they are far too frequent, and are becoming
increasingly so. If a physician were obliged, upon a definite state-
ment of symptoms, to conduct an original laboratory investigation
for each of a large proportion of his cases, the situation would
be analogous. His usefulness would be impaired, and his earning
power largely diminished, in spite of great additional charges
upon his patients. The legal profession has fallen into just this
situation. Much of its energies are expended in threshing over
old straw which has already been threshed by every lawyer or
court which has considered a similar case, and yet it has been
nobody's business to give to the profession at large the benefits of
a single thorough and searching investigation and analysis and
appraisal of the source material. The American Law Institute
proposes to fill just that need.
Experience in isolated fields of the law shows the demand for
and the usefulness of expert and authoritative statement. Among
others, the works of Poneroy on Equity, Wigmore on Evidence,
and Williston on Contracts, have been received by the courts and
the profession with such confidence in their accuracy of analysis
and fidelity of statement, that they stand in a large measure in
the place of the source material, the cases, upon which they are
based. Yet they have no authority except to those who by expe-
rience have learned their worth, and they have been produced by
private ambition and intiative, at private risk and expense. How
infinitely better could these excellent books be made if the profess-
ion generally, through some organization such as the American
Law Institute, should bear the expense of producing them, furnish-
ing adequate trained assistance to the principal author, and giving
him the benefit of criticism and suggestions from the courts, law
teachers and eminent lawyers in advance of final publication. All
this is within the plan of the American Law Institute. It seems
that we may expect from such a plan real Books of Authority,
which will go far to lead the profession out of the ever widening
wilderness.
Until such an authoritative re-statement shall be made, it would
seem that the only place -to find the law is in the source mate-
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rial, the cases, with such aids in the search as we now have in the
way of digests and compilations. Yet it is now, and is becoming,
physically impossible for the courts to go to the sources. A recent
writer' notes a "tendency of courts especially in the southern
and western states to cite the various legal encyclopedias in their
opinions as the basis of judicial decision. It is not unusual to
find such a citation given as the sole authority for the legal pre-
cept which is seized upon to determine the rights of litigants, ob-
viously because the search of the authorities wculd be either too
laborious or too uncertain in its results to justify the expenditure
of judicial labor upon it." To one familiar with the methods by
which the encyclopedias are and must be made, such a tendency in
the courts shows a desperate situation indeed. The work of these
publishers in collating citations and indicating the trend of decis-
ions is commendable and valuable. The staffs of writers who pro-
duce them take as their field the whole subject of the law, and write
this year upon torts, next year upon real property, and so through-
out the whole field of the law. Anyone who has attempted, as a
practitioner or teacher, to acquire an authoritative knowledge of
even one or two subjects of the law, knows that under modern
conditions the task is that of a lifetime. Professor Kales regarded
it as an ambitious task to become expert in the law of a few sub-
jects in a single jurisdiction.
It was not impossible for Blackstone and Kent to produce com-
mentaries covering the whole field of the law, yet it is worthy of
note that Kent, a century ago, lamented the "multiplicity of law
books," as "an evil that has become intolerable." Dean Stone
quotes the above statement of Kent, and then makes the following
comment :2
"Yet Kent's law library, assuming that it was complete with
reference to all American reports and statutes, would at that
time have embraced about 180 volumes of American reports
and less than one-third that number of American statutes. A
law library, correspondingly complete, at the present time would
have upon its shelves about 18,500 volumes of reports and 5,500
volumes of statutes. My mathematical friends tell me that, at
the same rate of progression, a law library correspondingly com-
plete one hundred years hence, assuming that we had buildings
in which to house it would reach the stupendous proportions of
1,850,000 volumes of reports and 550,000 volumes of statutes.
Harlan F. Stone, "Some Aspects of the P1,oblem of Law Simplification." 23 COL.
L. REV. 319 at 332 (1923).
2 Harlan F. Stone, "Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification." 23 COL.
L. REV. 319 at 320 (1923).
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There is of course reason to hope that the rate of increase in re-
ports and statutes will not be as rapid in the next century as
the last, and that instead of an increase represented by an as-
cending curve we may proceed at more nearly a level rate of
approximately the present of about 350 volumes of reports and
250 volumes of statutes per year. If we should succeed in stem-
ming the flood of law books to that extent, another century
would see a good working library for an American lawyer con-
taining something like 100,000 volumes of reports and statutes
and something more than half that number in fifty years. To
this, of course, would be added a suitable number of digests,
text-books and treatises."
The report of the Committee to the Washington meeting stated
that during the year 1914-1915 it was estimated that one hundred
and seventy five thousand pages of American reports and five
thousand pages of British reports had been published. The
profession cannot continue to bear the responsibility of. knowing
the law, when it is concealed in such a mass, without the assistance
of an approved and authoritative analysis and statement.
Assuming the re-statement of a given field of the law to have
been prepared, subjected to criticism and suggestion by courts,
expert practitioners, professors and business interests, revised,
approved by the Institute, and finally published, what will be
its status? That, of course, will depend upon the attitude of the
courts and the legislatures of the several states and that attitude
will be largely determined by the legal profession in those states.
The Institute does not desire that its re-statement should be enacted
into a code, since that would deprive our legal system of one of the
chief merits of the common law, its elasticity and adaptability.
If the legal question involved is undecided or uncertain in a par-
ticular state, the courts can, without more, adopt the re-state-
ment by decision, even though the weight of authority in other
states is at variance with the re-statement. Where the re-statement
is clearly at variance with prior decisions in the jurisdiction, the
courts could not follow the re-statement without overruling pre-
vious decisions. This the courts would hesitate to do without
legislative sanction, because vested property or contract rights
might be disturbed. It has been stated by eminent judicial author-
ity "that it is comparatively rare that the retroactive effect of
judge-made law actually involves hardship. In those instances
where precedent is overruled or limited it is seldom that the con-
duct of litigants has actually been influenced by the rule previously
laid down, or that overruling it has operated more harshly than
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would the creation of a new precedent where no rules had been
previously declared." 3 The writer does not fully agree with the
above statement, and believes that, generally speaking, the over-
ruling of previously settled rules of law should be avoided except
in cases of clear necessity, unless the retroactive effect of the
new decision can in some way be avoided. Certainly there are some
fields of the law, such as those of property and contracts where a
retroactive change in the law would work havoc, if not to the par-
ticular litigants, certainly to many other interests gained in 're-
liance on the former rule. Such an attitude of the courts toward
precedent would hardly be an auspicious beginning for a move-
ment which aims at greater certainty in the law.
Is there, then, any method by which the re-statement could be
followed in cases in which it is inconsistent with the previously
settled law of the jurisdiction. In some cases where courts have
held statutes unconstitutional, and have later overruled these
decisions, they have declared the statutes inoperative until the
time of the second decision.4 This is of course a frank departure
from the traditional common law conception that the courts merely
find and declare the existing law, and do not make it. Another
suggestion has been made, to the effect that the legislatures might
enact that the re-statement could be followed in those cases, and
in those cases only, which arise subsequent to the publication of
the re-statement 5 This would constitute a delegation of legisla-
tive power to the courts, by granting to them the power to
change the law. The constitutionality of such a provision should be
carefully scrutinized, to see whether it embodies a violation of
our doctrine of the separation of powers, which doctrine seems
nowadays "more honored in the breach than in the observance,"
but which does occasionally assert itself. The same observations
would apply to a legislative enactment giving the courts the power
to limit the effect of decisions following the restatement and over-
ruling precedent, to cases arising subsequent to the publication
of the re-statement.
The report of the Committee suggests tentatively that the leg-
islatures might give quasi-statutory sanction to the re-statement
by providing that it should have the force of principles enunciat-
3 Harlan F. Stone, "Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification," supra,
citing CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRoCEss, (1921) 146.
4 Freeman, "The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of an
Overruling Decision," 18 COL. L. REV. 230 (1918) ; Carpenter, 66 Court Decisions and
Common Law," 17 COL. L. RnV. 593 (1917).
5 Harlan F. Stone, "Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification," 23 COL.
L. REV. 319 at 336 (1923).
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ed as the basis of the decisions of the highest courts of the states,
the courts having power to declare modifications and exceptions,
or by providing that it should be used as a "guide and aid" to
the courts. It is difficult to see how this suggestion would obviate
the difficulty of retroactive decisions. It is probable that we shall
be obliged to do whatever is necessary to confer upon the courts
the power to make decisions which shall not be retroactive beyond
a fixed date. If the re-statement conflicts with a statute, then
it should be embodied into a statute to take the place of the con-
flicting one. The states have been willing to do this, for the sake
of uniformity and certainty, in the case of the statutes drafted by
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. In any event, a way
will be found whereby the re-statement will be received into the
body of the law of the states, and it will come as a welcome relief
to the profession which is now attempting to do that which is im-
possible, and which is becoming undeservedly discredited because
of its failure.
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